Causation: many words, one thing? by Casini, Lorenzo
Causation: Many Words, One Thing?
Lorenzo CASINI
Received: 15.11.2011
Final Version: 14.02.2012
BIBLID [0495-4548 (2012) 27: 74; pp. 203-219]
ABSTRACT: How many notions of cause are there? The causality literature is witnessing a flourish-
ing of pluralist positions. Here I focus on a recent debate on whether interpreting causality
in terms of inferential relations commits one to semantic pluralism (Reiss 2011) or not
(Williamson 2006). I argue that inferentialism is compatible with a ‘weak’ form of monism,
where causality is envisaged as one, vague cluster concept. I offer two arguments for this,
one for vagueness, one for uniqueness. Finally, I qualify in what sense the resulting form of
monism is ‘weak’.
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RESUMEN: ¿Cuántas nociones de causa hay? Hay un resurgir de posiciones pluralistas en la bibli-
ografía sobre causalidad. Me ocuparé aquí de un debate reciente sobre si la interpretación
de la causalidad en términos de relaciones inferenciales nos compromete con el plural-
ismo semántico (Reiss 2011) o no (Williamson 2006). Defiendo que el inferencialismo es
compatible con una forma ’debil’ de monismo, donde la causalidad se presenta como un
único concepto vago y de agrupación (cluster). Ofrezco para ello dos argumentos, uno so-
bre vaguedad y otro sobre unicidad. Finalmente, matizaré en qué sentido esta forma de
monismo es ’débil’.
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As the reader may have noticed, the title of this paper is reminiscent of an-
other, well-known paper in the causality literature, namely Nancy Cartwright
(2004)’s ‘Causation: One Word, Many Things’. There she defended a metaphys-
ical thesis, inspired by Anscombe (1971), which is a leitmotif in her writings
on causality: “causal” is a label which is attached to a plurality of essentially
different relations. What is perhaps less known is that in the same paper as well
as later work Cartwright has also advanced – although not fully articulated –
another, interesting thesis on the meaning of causality, namely that causality
is a sort of ‘inference license’.
Can one, in the face of pluralism, explain why the same label, “causal”,
is attached to all these relations? And need an inferentialist approach to the
meaning of causality commit one to semantic pluralism (Reiss 2011) or not
(Williamson 2006)?
This paper aims to answer exactly these questions. If we believe that the
fact that seemingly different relations are all labelled “causal” needs a philo-
sophical explanation, I claim that inferentialism can provide the desired expla-
nation, in terms of the inferences that causal claims license.
In particular, I will be concerned with clarifying how, if at all, inferentialism
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can be used to defend a sort of ‘weak’ semantic monism, where causality is
envisaged as one, vague cluster concept. I offer two arguments for this, one
for vagueness, one for uniqueness. Finally, I qualify in what sense the resulting
form of monism is ‘weak’.
1. The monist’s challenge
The term “causal pluralism” has been recently associated with a variety of
positions, all sharing the idea that there are distinct kinds of causal relations,
and no single feature that makes all of them causal. From which it follows that
no monistic account of causality as, e.g., regular association, probability raising,
counterfactual dependence, mechanism, etc. is possible.1 But underlying this
one, shared idea is a plurality of positions.
Here I focus on two specific kinds of pluralism, namely evidential pluralism
(Williamson 2006, Russo and Williamson 2007) and semantic (or conceptual)
pluralism (Reiss 2009, 2011). An evidential pluralist is pluralist in the minimal
sense that he acknowledges that evidence of more than one kind contributes
to establish a causal claim. A semantic pluralist, instead, claims that there
are various (perhaps ‘fuzzy’) notions of cause. Whilst evidential pluralism is
in principle compatible with conceptual monism, semantic pluralism is clearly
not.
Against all pluralisms – except the evidential one – the monist (Williamson
2006, Russo and Williamson 2007) maintains that, although causal claims may
be supported by distinct evidential criteria, there is just one notion of cause.
This position is in line with the epistemic view of causality, according to which
a causal relation is the inference relation drawn by an ideal, fully rational and
informed agent (cf. Williamson 2005, 2006).2 Since the epistemic view purports
to say what causality ‘essentially’ is, it is a metaphysical view. However, insofar
as it defines the meaning of causality in terms of inferences, it also counts as a
position on the semantics of causal claims. Only the latter aspect, and not the
details of the epistemic view, is relevant to the purpose of this paper. Here, I will
only be concerned with the epistemic monist’s objection against pluralism, in
particular with its implications for Reiss’ semantic pluralism. Accordingly, my
argument will only concern the semantics, not the metaphysics of causality.3
1 Here I am not concerned with justifying pluralism. Rather, I will assume that causality
is diverse – no analysis captures its meaning exhaustively – and consider how pluralist
one should be.
2 To clarify: contra ‘traditional’ monistic analyses, the epistemic view is – minimally –
pluralist as it doesn’t erect any test condition to the status of truth condition; at the
same time, it also maintains that there is something all causal relations have in common,
namely their being (ideal) inference relations.
3 This is not to say that inferentialism is incompatible with giving causal talk a referential
value, or being ‘realist’ about causality. In this regard, it would be worth considering
whether a case can be made for inferentialism providing something more substantial
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Williamson’s objection to pluralism is that it cannot explain why the same
label “causal” is used to denote a variety of seemingly different – and differently
characterised – relations. If one believes this is a philosophically interesting
question, then one will demand that a theory of causality provide an answer
to it. Notice that some deny that the question deserves a philosophical answer
(see Psillos 2009, Reiss 2009). In §4., I endeavour to show that an interesting,
philosophical story can be told, viz. an inferentialist story.
If one finds pluralism dissatisfying, one may want to resort to one or the
other kind of monism. One, as I said, is epistemic monism. Another, as I argue
in §4., is the (Sellersian-Brandomian) version of causal inferentialism I sketch
in §2.
That inferentialism may have monistic implications is suggested by Cart-
wright herself who, after pointing to the possibility to interpret causal claims
as inference licenses (cf. Cartwright 2007, p. 46), states: “What we should be
looking for is a theory of causality, in much the same way as we have a theory
of the electron” (Cartwright 2007, p. 52). It is now commonplace that there
are no necessary and sufficient conditions that define theoretical terms; still,
we have theories that give one story about them. Cartwright seems to think –
here, at least – that the same reasoning applies to causality.
To the inferentialist camp belong, besides Cartwright, also Godfrey-Smith
(2009) and Reiss (2011). Yet, they define their inferentialism differently – so
that only Godfrey-Smith but not Reiss can be associated with the sort of weak,
conceptual monism I am arguing for in this paper (see §4.2.).
Interestingly, what the advocates of both epistemic monism (Williamson
2005, 2006) and inferentialism (Reiss 2011) have in common is that they tend
to characterise causality in terms of inferential relations (see §3.). Reiss, in
particular, explicitly draws his pluralist conclusion from an inferentialist ap-
proach to the semantics of causal claims. So the question arises as to whether
endorsing inferentialism need to commit one to semantic pluralism (Reiss) or
not (Williamson). Before tackling this question in §4., I will briefly sketch the
contours of an inferentialist account of causality.
2. Causality as inference
Inferentialism is an approach to semantics (Brandom 2000, 2007, Peregrin
2006, 2012), rooted in the pragmatist tradition (Sellars 1953, Wittgenstein
1956), and only recently advocated in philosophy of science (Brigandt 2010,
Reiss 2011). In short, inferentialism purports to account for the meaning of
linguistic expressions in terms of “what can both serve as and stand in need of
than a story on the ‘expressivist’ role of our conceptual activity (cf. Brandom). However,
this would require a separate argument – an argument that I cannot give here. I leave
this to future work. For the purpose of this paper, we may be anything from eliminativist
(à la Psillos) to Anscombian pluralist (à la Cartwright) as regards the metaphysics of
causality. This has no implications for the general point I wish to make.
Theoria 74 (2012): 203-219
206 Lorenzo CASINI
 
controlled experiments, 
RCTs, 
observational studies, 
simulations, 
statistical analyses, etc. 
(plus theoretical and 
background 
assumptions) 
explanations, 
predictions, 
interventions 
‘causes’ 
inference base causal claim inference target 
Figure 1: Causality as inference
reasons” (Brandom 2007, p. 654), that is, in terms of inferential relations be-
tween circumstances of appropriate application (premisses of inferences) and
appropriate consequences of application (conclusions of inferences).
Expressions derive their meaning from the rules of inference they obey (see
Brandom 2007, §1-§3). In particular, subsentential locutions derive their mean-
ing not from their referential function but from the sentences in which they
occur; and sentences, in turn, derive their meaning not from truth-valuations
or truth-conditions but from their inferential role (cf. Sellars 1962).
As regards the meaning of a given sentence (e.g., a specific causal claim such
as ‘X causes Y ’), its meaning-constitutive inferences can be divided into those
that, respectively, warrant the sentence and are warranted by it. Following
Reiss (2011), I call the sentences that warrant the claim ‘inferential base’ and
those warranted by it ‘inferential target’.
As regards the content of a concept, this is defined by Brandom (2007)
in terms of inferences and incompatibilities.4 We need not be concerned with
the details of Brandom’s semantics, only bear in mind that the inferentialist
has a machinery to get the meaning of words (e.g.: ‘causes’; ‘causality’) out of
inferences.
Now, if one endorses inferentialism about meaning, what should one say
about the meaning of causality? Arguably, the meaning of causal claims is
constituted by and analysable in terms of inferential relations between evidence
of experiments, results of RCTs, observational studies, simulations, statistical
analyses, etc. (together with theoretical and background assumptions) on the
one hand, and possible explanations, predictions and interventions on the other
(see figure 1). But is this sufficient to say what ‘causes’ means?
4 In particular, the class of inferences must comprise not just the logically correct ones
but also the materially correct ones, and not only language-to-language inferences,
but also inferences involving non-inferential circumstances of appropriate application
(observations) and non-inferential appropriate consequences of application (actions)
(Brandom 2007).
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Problems may arise here (see §3.), having to do with identifying the meaning-
constitutive inferences of, respectively, a particular causal claim and ‘causality’
simpliciter (i.e., ‘causes’ as occurring in all causal claims). At the root of these
problems is a traditional trouble for inferentialism, viz. semantic holism: If the
meaning of linguistic expressions is inference, and inferences are all related to
one another, then the meaning of any one linguistic expression depends on
all inferences (see Quine 1951). How can one isolate the meaning-constitutive
inferences from the non-meaning-constitutive ones?
In the case of causality, the problem may be particularly acute. Intuitively,
holism seems easier to address in the case of observational statements and
expressions5, which are ‘low-level’, viz. closer to the observational contexts in
terms of which their meaning can be made explicit. But ‘causality’ is (often)
‘high-level’, and related to observational contexts only ‘indirectly’, through
many other inferences. All the more reason to believe that ‘causes’, whether
in a specific claim or simpliciter, is so entrenched in our conceptual apparatus
that its meaning-constitutive inferences are too ‘distributed’ to be isolated.
Now, whether the inferentialist approach is in general successful depends
on whether a general response to holism is successful.6 This is an open issue
which I need not address here. Rather, I will assume that one such response is
available and, as a result, semantic holism may be contained, at least for a class
of concepts, or for some concepts better than others. Even on this assumption,
we still need an additional argument to the point that causality is among those
concepts for which meaning can be specified. Providing such an argument is
apparently harder because of the centrality of the notion of causality in our
conceptual apparatus. Still, I want to argue that there is room for a weak form
of semantic monism.
I will now present in some more detail evidential and semantic pluralism
and their connections with inferentialism, before discussing in §4. whether and
to what extent they follow from the above-sketched inferentialist semantics.
3. Evidential vs semantic pluralism
Should we endorse only evidential pluralism Williamson (2006), Russo and
Williamson (2007) or also semantic pluralism (Reiss 2009, 2011)? For the evi-
dential pluralist, traditional monistic accounts offer at most evidence for causal
relations, i.e., test conditions, not exhaustive analyses, i.e., truth conditions.
Provided one rejects such accounts, this claim is quite straightforward and
uncontentious. More contentious is whether these different analyses identify
distinct notions of cause. The debate has an obvious bearing on whether the
attempt to provide a conceptually monistic account of causality is well-founded.
5 Yet, it seems possible to define inferentially logical vocabulary (see Peregrin 2006).
6 To deal with holism, the inferentialist might resort to, e.g., Sellars (1948) or Brandom
(1994) (cf. Brandom 2007, §4).
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On the one hand, in line with his epistemic view, Williamson claims that
different kinds of evidence for causal claims do not presuppose different con-
cepts of causality. The evidence gathered by using the various criteria, which
‘typically’ apply together, is evaluated depending on how well it conduces to
successful uses – viz. successful predictions, interventions and explanations –
so as to univocally constrain rational belief in what causes what.
On the other hand, Reiss suggests the following identity condition for the
meaning of ‘causes’:
Suppose the term ‘cause’ is used on two different occasions and it is not known
whether it has the same meaning on both occasions. Two such claims would have
the form ‘X α-causes Y ’ and ‘Z β-causes W ’. We can then say that ‘α-causes’ has
the same meaning as ‘β-causes’ (on these occasions) to the extent that ‘X α-causes
Y ’ is inferentially connected to the same kinds of propositions regarding the rela-
tion between X and Y as ‘Z β-causes W ’ is inferentially connected to propositions
regarding the relation between Z and W (Reiss 2011, pp. 923-924).
This condition relativises the meaning of a token causal claim to both kind and
number of criteria the claim is inferentially related to – where ‘criteria’ stands
here for both test conditions (base criteria) and use conditions, or purposes
(target criteria). One thing, in fact, is to say what ‘causes’ simpliciter means,
quite another thing to say what ‘X causes Y ’ means when applied to population
P1 as opposed to population P2, since, e.g., mechanisms or probabilities by
which the effect is brought about as well as criteria used to establish the claim
may be different in P1 and P2.
For this reason, the meaning of any causal claim – e.g., in epidemiology,
‘exposure to aflatoxin causes liver cancer’ – is population-relative:
(...) in general, when the causal claim concerns the toxicity of a substance, language
users are entitled to inferences about a given population only when the inferential
base contains evidence claims about just that population (Reiss 2011, p. 917).
To this consideration, one may add that identity depends not only on sameness
of kinds of sentences, or (formal) criteria, but also on sameness of contents of
sentences, or ‘propositions’. This further condition seems implied by what Reiss
himself elsewhere states: “[t]here is a definite set of propositions with which
any causal claim is inferentially related” (Reiss 2011, p. 924).7 Notice that this
applies even when the same relata, hence the same causal claim type (as in,
e.g., ‘X α-causes Y ’ and ‘X β-causes Y ’), are concerned. That is, meaning
depends not just on base and target criteria but also on the specific content
of base and target sentences. Indeed, the content of the sentences need not
coincide with the content of the criteria. For instance, one thing is to say how
a randomised control trial (RCT) is inferentially related to a causal claim, i.e.,
7 Admittedly, the content of base and target sentences may not count, for Reiss, as part
of the identity conditions for ‘causes’. Indeed, that he intends to impose this further
condition is denied by him (private communication). Still, pace Reiss, his argument for
the unspecificity of ‘causes’ presupposes this condition (see §4.1.).
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how it is to be conducted to provide support for the claim. Another thing
is to specify how the meaning of ‘exposure to aflatoxin causes liver cancer’
– whether applied to different populations (e.g., mice and humans) or to the
very same population – depends on the particular way the RCT is conducted,
i.e., the specific individuals on which the RCT is performed (each, arguably,
instantiating slightly different mechanisms), the result of the randomisation
in a specific trial, etc. So, even on the assumption that the criteria are the
same, meanings may end up different depending on the different circumstances
in which tests are performed and on the different actions taken – described,
respectively, in base and target.
Now, since meaning of both criteria and contents is to be defined inferen-
tially, it is easy for pairs of inferential webs to differ somewhere. No surprise
that Reiss takes inferentialism to entail conceptual pluralism: the concept of
cause is “unspecific rather than ambiguous” (Reiss 2011, p. 914), and should
be replaced by a plurality of well-defined – or well-definable – concepts.
Who is right? In spite of the disagreement, both Williamson and Reiss
maintain that causality has to do with inference. Shouldn’t we expect from
inferentialism itself to deliver an answer on the monism-vs-pluralism debate?
Well, things are not so easy. Two readings, in fact, are available.
According to a first reading, clearly adopted by Reiss, ‘causes’ is ambiguous
and differs from claim to claim, depending on the particular base and target.
That is, tokens of ‘causes’ used in claims established by different methods and
licensing different inferences have different meanings.
A second reading, instead, has it that the premisses from which causal
claims are entailed, and the conclusions that causal claims entail, only differ as
to the weight of the different kinds of inferences which, respectively, warrant the
claims and the claims warrant. Causality is only ‘moderately’ diverse: criteria
employed in different circumstances, although weighted differently, are similar
enough to legitimate a strong clustering among the various tokens of ‘causes’.
This second reading, for which causality is one ‘cluster concept’, is closer to
Williamson’s position.
The issue is all the more relevant insofar as, according to one’s favourite
reading of the inferentialist take on meaning, evidential and semantic pluralism
give two different answers to the question of what, if at all, is the philosophically
interesting fact that explains the use of “causal” to denote all kinds of causal
relations. As mentioned, for Reiss there is no fact of the matter: whether dif-
ferent criteria ‘typically’ coincide is an empirical not conceptual matter, “much
like discovering that various symptoms of a disease typically co-occur” (Reiss
2009, p. 33) (cf. Psillos 2009); “why we have come to call the different kinds of
relationships causal is a matter of historical, not philosophical, inquiry” (Reiss
2009, p. 37). For Williamson, instead, there is one fact of the matter: different
criteria typically coincide because they all provide evidence for the same (kind
of) relation; we have come to call all these relations ‘causal’ because they all
share the role of licensing inferences. Which answer is correct?
The issue largely depends on whether ‘causes’ is to be regarded as vague, as
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the monist can maintain, or unspecific, as Reiss claims. If ‘causes’ is vague, there
can be one cluster. In this case, vagueness is semantic.8 If ‘causes’ is unspe-
cific, instead, there are irreducibly many notions. On this view, the ‘vagueness’
is epistemic, i.e., it concerns ignorance on which of many distinct notions is
employed in each case: “True, we might not always have a very clear idea of
what [the meaning-constitutive sets of propositions] are. But this is a question
of epistemology, not of semantics” (Reiss 2011, p. 924).
One way to tackle the issue is to look at the foundations of the inferentialist
project itself. As mentioned, granting that holism can be contained, we still
need an argument to show that ‘causality’ is liable to be analysed inferentially.
More specifically, holism generates two further problems: (i) the (in)stability
of conceptual contents under change of belief and commitment to the properties
of various inferences; and (ii) the (im)possibility of communication between
individuals who endorse different claims and inferences. But, then, how can a
change in one belief not result in a change in all other beliefs? And how can
two speakers’ whose beliefs differ somewhere ever talk about the same thing?
When it comes to causality, the inferentialist needs an argument to guar-
antee, in the face of the holistic nature of meaning, (i) the relative stability of
conceptual content of ‘causes’ and (ii) the possibility of successful communica-
tion on causal claims. In §4., I show that, if these two goals can be achieved,
holism can be contained in a way that makes room for ‘causes’ being one and
vague rather than unspecific. I offer two arguments to this point, – one for the
vagueness of the notion of cause – the ‘argument from (in-)stability of content’
– another for its uniqueness – the ‘argument from communication’.
4. Causality as one, vague concept
4.1. Argument from (in-)stability of content
To begin with, notice that Reiss’ argument for semantic pluralism trades on an
ambiguity between (i) analysing meaning in terms of different sets of (token)
sentences and (ii) analysing it in terms of sets of different kinds (or types) of
sentences within those sets.
On the first interpretation, strong semantic pluralism follows straightfor-
wardly. To each inference base and target of (token) sentences there correspond
a different meaning. However, this would make it strictly speaking impossible
for linguistic expressions to share the same kind of meaning – unless some simi-
larity criterion is allowed, that is, unless one opts for the second interpretation.
Intuitively, it must be possible and legitimate to group linguistic expressions
depending on their similar inferential roles. Analogy of inferential roles could
then be used to make meaning of kinds of linguistic expressions explicit. Oth-
erwise one would be stuck with (meaning of) single-case claims and unable to
8 My argument does not rely on a philosophical interpretation of vagueness. An intuitive
notion of ‘vague’ as ‘non-fully-specifiable’ suffices here.
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formulate general claims.
The second interpretation is surely more attractive. Here, strong semantic
pluralism follows only on the assumption of a ‘double standard’ for the seman-
tics of ‘causes’ and the ancillary notions (e.g., ‘depends’, ‘produces’) that help
make ‘causes’ explicit. That is, if one wants to distinguish between kinds of
sentences – which is plausible – and still draw the same pluralist conclusion on
the meaning of causal claims, one must have a similarity criterion that legiti-
mates the clustering of sentences in base and target of the ancillary notions but
prohibits the clustering of sentences in base and target of ‘causes’. For instance,
the criterion will dictate that the circumstances that entail and are entailed
by ‘probabilistically depends’ are similar enough to make one cluster, whereas
those that entail and are entailed by ‘causes’ are not. As a result, ‘probabilis-
tically depends’ counts as a cluster concept, whereas ‘causes’ is an unspecific
term that subsumes a plurality of specific concepts. But this is problematic, as
I am now going to show.
For the inferentialist, language is essentially dynamic. This means that
any codification or theoretical systematization of the uses of (...) vocabulary-kinds
by associating with them meanings that determine which uses are correct will, if
at all successful, be successful only contingently, locally, and temporarily (Brandom
2008, p. 5).
Drawing on this insight, the thesis of the argument from (in-)stability of content
(S ) is that the respect in which different meanings differ cannot be made fully
explicit not only for epistemic but also for semantic reasons:
S1. Communication can be unsuccessful, not only because of the ignorance of the
speakers, but also because language is a dynamic network of concepts.
S2. If so, then the meaning of ‘x -causes’ can be specified only on-the-fly by suc-
cessful use.
S3. But, at any time, also the meanings of the ancillary notions that should make
‘x -causes’ semantically explicit is specified on-the-fly.
SC. Hence, the meaning of ‘x -causes’ can be – semantically – only partially specified,
or specifiable. That is, it is not only semantically unspecific but also semantically
vague.
To claim otherwise would mean to accept the double standard: meaning of
ancillary notions is vague whereas meaning of ‘causes’ is unspecific. But how
could this be justified?
True, the meaning of ancillary notions may be easier to make explicit.
In inferentialist terms, their tokens are easier to group as belonging to the
same kind on the basis of their inferential role. For instance, the meaning of
‘probability raising’ or ‘counterfactual dependence’ can be formally fixed in
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terms of necessary (target) and sufficient (base) conditions. However, holism
applies to such concepts, too: when it comes to applying the formally-defined
concept to non-formal circumstances, it is still left to us to decide whether
the formal notion applies or not – whether ‘X raises the probability of Y ’ or
‘Y counterfactually depends on X’, etc. Strictly speaking, no concept can be
totally isolated from the other concepts.
And if one applies to the ancillary notions the same strict identity condi-
tion which is applied to ‘causes’, one ought to conclude that distinct tokens
of the ancillary notions (e.g., ‘α-probabilistically raises’ as occurring in ‘X α-
probabilistically raises Y ’ as opposed to ‘β-probabilistically raises’ as occurring
in ‘Z β-probabilistically raises W ’) have distinct meanings, since their infer-
ential role is fixed by distinct sets of sentences. Token sentences in base and
target are different for each claim – whether involving the concept of cause or
other concepts.
So Reiss’ argument for unspecificity generalises in principle to the ancillary
notions: one cannot say there are many distinct, unspecified concepts of causal-
ity without at the same time saying that there are many distinct, unspecified
concepts of probability raising, counterfactual dependence, etc. From which it
follows that if we want the meaning of the ancillary notions to be semantically
vague on similarity grounds, then we should allow causality to be vague as
well, on the same grounds.
Admittedly, one could object to this analysis that the vagueness of ‘causes’
is of a different kind from that of the ancillary notions, ‘causes’ being more like
a multiply-realisable concept (e.g., ‘bird’, realised by distinct species of bird),
the ancillary notions more like non-multiply-realisable concepts (e.g., ‘bald’).
But even granting that this is so, we don’t deny that there is one, legitimate
concept of ‘bird-ness’.9 So why deny that there is one concept of ‘causality’?
Now, a serious problem may arise, having to do with the possibility of mean-
ingful communication. If the identity of meaning depends on the inferences in
terms of which the meaning is analysed, and is only partially fixed/fixable, how
can meaning be stable enough to allow us to discuss about the same things? In
particular, how can meaning be stable enough so that we can make it explicit in
communication, by clarifying the inferential presuppositions and implications
of what we say, so as to resolve controversies on what claims to endorse?
Clearly, due to holism, meaning cannot be totally transparent to the speak-
ers (see above). Yet, much of what we say, in particular many of the implications
of our commitments, must be transparent to us – otherwise communication
wouldn’t be possible. Granted that holism can be contained, there must be a
‘semantic level’ at which meaning of many notions that we use in communi-
cation is stable enough. Arguably, that is the level at which meaning is vague
enough for the speakers to take it as one and treat its possible applications as
9 To reiterate a point made earlier (see fn. 3), I am not concerned here with metaphysical
issues, such as whether or not there is an object-type the concept refers to, whether
bird-ness is a ‘natural’ kind, whether causal relations are ‘real’, etc.
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similar enough. That is the level at which, I claim, there is a unique concept of
causality. But here we need an argument to the point that we can legitimately
talk of one vague notion of causality, as opposed to many vague notions.
4.2. Argument from communication
Before presenting the argument, it is crucial to point out the source of the dif-
ference between Reiss and Williamson in the unity-vs-disunity debate, namely
the different weight they ascribe to base and target.
On the one hand, Williamson places more weight on the target. All kinds
of evidence are required, in principle, to establish a causal claim (Russo and
Williamson 2007). This is because, ultimately, their role is helping maximise
the target’s success. The meaning-constitutive inferences are (only) claim-to-
target inferences (see Williamson 2006, p. 78). And since the target is a unique
class of claims, namely explanations, predictions and claims about results of
interventions, there is one notion of cause. That is, the unity of purpose(s) is
what fixes the meaning of ‘causes’ and blocks the fragmentation. Here, infer-
entialism is used to explain philosophically the uniqueness of meaning.
On the other hand, Reiss places more weight on the base: “whereas the
meaning of an expression is given by its inferential connections (...), its method
of verification determines what these inferential connections are” (Reiss 2011,
p. 923). And since we have many ways to establish a causal claim, i.e., many
appropriate base-to-claim inferences, we have many concepts of cause as well
(see Reiss 2011, p. 924). Nor does an appeal to purposes (target) help unify.
Rather, purposes disunify, by pulling apart the role of causal claims. So, an
epidemiologist may be interested in explaining whether the population-level
correlation between aflatoxin exposure and liver cancer is due to the carcino-
genicity of aflatoxin; a policy maker in knowing whether controlling aflatoxin
is an effective way to reduce mortality; someone exposed to aflatoxin in pre-
dicting whether this exposure will result in a higher chance of liver cancer. To
the three purposes there correspond different criteria to establish the causal
claim, hence different meanings of cause (see Reiss 2011, §3-§5) – even within
the very same discipline (cf. Reiss 2009, §6). The fact that different relations
are all called ‘causal’ has no philosophical significance. Inferentialism is only
invoked to describe the fragmentation, not to explain the way this came about,
which is a contingent, historical matter.
Here, it is worth contrasting Reiss’ position with Godfrey-Smith (2009)’s.
For Godfrey-Smith, a cluster concept is an “amiable jumble” of criteria, such
that its criteria sometimes pull apart but ‘typically’ don’t. Causality is pecu-
liar because the jumble is “cantankerous”, not amiable (Godfrey-Smith 2009,
p. 331). By this, he means that causality is partly an “essentially contested
concept” (ECC) and partly low-level, or uncontentious. It is ECC, because
it is not just hard to work out when the conditions of application are met, but (...)
the conditions for application themselves are, given the concept’s role, permanently
susceptible to being challenged and renegotiated (Godfrey-Smith 2009, p. 335)
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However, it has also low-level, uncontentious uses, where disputes with respect
to boundaries and criteria for application can be resolved. Terms with both
ECC and low-level uses acquire their role when
their successful application has significant downstream consequences, but their do-
main is complex in ways that involve the absence of sharp boundaries that function
as attractors to usage. [In the case of causality], an accepted set of exemplars and
a sense of shared purpose behind diverse uses prevent a fragmentation into distinct
concepts. These ideas might be linked to tools developed in recent ‘inferentialist’
philosophy of language (...) (Godfrey-Smith 2009, p. 336)
In virtue of such a shared sense of purpose, unity prevails over disunity. This
conclusion, partly reached by invoking inferentialism, is in obvious disagree-
ment with Reiss, for whom an appeal to purpose does not prevent fragmenta-
tion.
How should one decide between evidential and semantic pluralism? To
answer this question, partly drawing on Godfrey-Smith’s distinction between
ECC and low-level uses, I employ the argument from communication (C ):
C1. For distinct concepts to exist there have to be different communities using
the same word with different meanings, and yet either (i) never successfully
communicating by using the word, viz. never agreeing whether implicitly or
explicitly on its rules of ‘correct’ application; or (ii) communicating by using
the word but never discovering the disagreement on such rules.
C2. The second option is clearly implausible, as evidenced by the explicit, semantic
disagreements among both scientists and philosophers.
C3. The first option is implausible, too: true, often different communities don’t
discuss subject-specific causal claims; but sometimes they do; plus, sometimes
they engage in high-level semantic reflections; in both cases, they can reach
semantic agreement.
CC. Therefore, ‘causes’ can be – in a sense to be qualified – one concept.
This argument agrees with Williamson that – in a sense – purposes con-
tribute to unify, whilst conceding to Reiss that – in another sense – they don’t.
What exactly are the two senses can be illustrated in terms of different seman-
tic levels, i.e., different contexts in which purposes play their role in fixing the
meaning (see below). Depending on the level, we may have either unity (un-
contentious uses) or disunity (contentious uses). In both low- and high-level
cases, a shared purpose – together with the taking of our linguistic expres-
sions as committing us to certain consequences10 – tends to generate a shared
commitment on meaning. That is, several speakers/communities that given
10 This is usually referred to by the inferentialist as the ‘normativity of meaning’ (see
Peregrin 2012).
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some accepted base agree on endorsing a claim ought to agree on the claims
that follow from it and the claims that are incompatible with it – that is,
they ought not deny (respectively, endorse) the claims that follow from it (are
incompatible with it), once they are made aware of them.
First, I agree with Godfrey-Smith that unity is possible at the subject-
specific, low level of token, ‘C causes E’ claims. This may not be the case
when, say, distinct claims (e.g., ‘X causes Y ’ and ‘Z causesW ’) are concerned.
Here, different purposes can easily produce low-level variability. However, take
the same claim, e.g., ‘exposure to aflatoxin causes liver cancer’, and distinct
communities holding some commitment (not necessarily the same) towards the
claim, e.g., community A endorsing the claim in the light of an RCT in mice,
community B not endorsing it, in the light of an observational study in humans.
Here, disunity is possible only provided findings of one community about the
claim, obtained by using one criterion and ensuing in certain consequences,
once communicated to the other community do not at all affect their commit-
ment to the claim. But this sounds implausible. For instance, it is implausible
that A’s evidence for the causal connection between aflatoxin and liver cancer
in mice has no bearing on B’s belief that aflatoxin causes liver cancer in hu-
mans. Reasoning from analogy, especially on evolutionary grounds, is common
in science. And the possibility of an RCT in mice and not in humans doesn’t
seem to be reason enough for the meaning of ‘causes’ in the two claims to be
of different kinds.
On the contrary, whenever scientists coming from different backgrounds in-
teract, for instance in interdisciplinary projects, they must agree on the inter-
pretation of their results as well as accept the bearing of each others’ methods
on such results. The outcome of their research is very often the formulation of
causal claims. When urged by philosophers to say what they mean by ‘C causes
E’, scientists may well disagree – this largely depends on how their training
shapes their methods and purposes. However, they also need to come up with a
coherent story. After all, the causal claim is the result of a collaborative effort,
shared methodology, assumptions, results’ interpretation, etc. There must be
something they all mean by ‘C causes E’, at least in that context.
One instance of such interdisciplinary projects is EnviroGenoMarkers.11
This project is driven by the success of past epidemiological studies in identify-
ing the risk of environmental exposures (e.g., air pollution and passive smoking)
with respect to the onset of chronic diseases (e.g., cancer and coronary artery
disease). The current project, whose methodology comprises both experiments
on biological samples and observational studies, aims at “the identification of
both biomarkers of exposure (e.g., dietary components, environmental pollu-
tants) and of markers of early damage (e.g., early disease-specific metabolic
changes), notably for carcinogenesis” (Chadeau-Hyam et al. 2011, p. 84). The
team includes chemists, molecular biologists, epidemiologists, statisticians, etc.
Due to such a diverse composition, one would expect a clash of intuitions
11 For more information on the project, see http://www.envirogenomarkers.net/.
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on what counts as causal. In spite of this, there is agreement in interpreting
previous studies on environmental exposures as providing evidence for causal
claims: “biomarkers (...) have contributed to make the association more plau-
sibly causal” (Vineis et al. 2009, p. 54). And with regard to their own study,
the team maintains that “the finding that preclinical biomarkers shown to be
related to particular exposures in prospective studies are also elevated in cer-
tain subclasses of disease would strengthen causal links between exposures and
disease” (Chadeau-Hyam et al. 2011, p. 85). At the same time, the connection
between purposes is implicitly acknowledged: “intermediate biomarkers can
provide important mechanistic insight into the pathogenesis of environmental
diseases” (Vineis et al. 2009, p. 54). That is, a successful prediction provides
at least some explanation. This supports my unity-over-disunity claim: to the
extent that there is some connection between purposes, successful communi-
cation is conducive to low-level unity, not fragmentation.
Secondly – here I part with Godfrey-Smith – unity may be possible also
at the non-subject-specific, high level where speakers discuss the meaning of
a word, e.g., ‘causes’ (now treated as a type), and agree on the formal criteria
that are ‘typically’ associated with it. In science, such ‘abstract’ discussions
may not take place frequently, but they do take place sometimes. Instead, in
areas of discourse such as philosophy they take place on a regular basis. Now,
whenever they take place beween any two speakers A and B, provided the
(counter-)examples used by A, who adopts certain rules for the use of some
expression, are regarded by B as informative on the correctness of B’s rules of
application for that expression, the possibility of some unique concept – that
is, a shared core of rules – that A and B are referring to is presupposed.
This largely depends on the existence of a stable class of interrelated pur-
poses. In particular, the class must be stable enough, so that discussions on the
appropriate tools to achieve the purposes, in the light of past consequences of
the tools’ application, can take place. And the purposes must be interrelated
enough, so that the success with regard to one purpose, driven by the appli-
cation of one tool, affects to some extent the other purposes as well. These
two conditions seem both well satisfied in the case of causality. Here the class
of purposes, i.e., prediction, intervention and explanation, is traditionally very
stable. And, although meaning is in principle flexible, such a class seems – al-
though this is just my best guess on the way our linguistic practice will evolve
– very unlikely to change. Also, the purposes are strongly interrelated. So, it
is hardly the case that a good explanation (say, a mechanistic explanation of
how aflatoxin causes liver cancer) has no bearing on successful prediction, when
the appropriate circumstances are in place (when the individual instantiates
the mechanism); and it is unlikely that a successful prediction (a preclinical
biomarker predicting, in the presence of some exposure, the onset of the dis-
ease) tells us nothing on possible interventions (either directly, if the biomarker
is itself a cause, or indirectly, if disease and biomarker are effects of a common
cause); etc. If the above reasoning is correct, then making explicit the meaning
of this unique, high-level concept is in principle possible. Causality need not
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be essentially contested. Unity can be achieved and, although it is ultimately
dependent on variations in tools and purposes, is likely to remain stable.
Conclusion
Why is the same label “causal” applied to many, seemingly-different relations?
Answer: their sharing the feature of licensing certain inferences. What infer-
ences? This may depend on the context as well as the purpose of the enquirer.
So, in what sense can ‘causes’ have the same meaning – across contexts and
purposes? In the sense that, as far as our tools and purposes are stable enough
(so that we can make them explicit) and related to one another (so that there
is something to make explicit), there is, as a matter of fact, one, vague cluster
of criteria that helps us best achieve those purposes. ‘Causes’ may have, after
all, one, vague meaning.
But should ‘causes’ have the same meaning? Yes, it ‘should’, in a qualified
sense: we should strive towards unification – not fragmentation – to understand
to what extent we are using the same concept, e.g., to what extent the endorse-
ment of ‘C causes E’ in one context should carry over to another context. In
this sense, inferentialism can support a ‘weak’ form of conceptual monism, by
promoting the identification of shared assumptions and implications behind
our causal judgements. The aim is to make explicit the contexts which we
implicitly take to warrant the inference to the claim, and the jobs that we
implicitly want the claim to do for us, that is, the entitlements that we expect
the claim to provide us with and the purposes that we expect the claim to help
us satisfy.
Why is such a monism ‘weak’ then? Because the issue of what ‘causes’
means cannot be settled once and for all, by either scientists or philosophers.
If our concepts are dynamic, only partly constrained by our practices and
Nature’s inputs and outputs to such practices, we can only try to interpret
concepts on-the-fly. Their meaning – ‘causes’ included – must be called into
question, made explicit and renegotiated, in a never-ending ‘virtuous’ circle.
There is no ultimate court and no ultimate judge. In the case of causality, one
(I) can only hope that meaning can be made explicit enough, core inferences
identified, and vagueness contained.
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